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REPORT
Number 29--December 1979

UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA

Milk Regulation in Montana

LI BR ARY

by
William 0. Bronson*

Government price control is an old institution. If often
has been supported by businessmen eager to escape the
discipline of the free market as well as by public officials
determined to reestablish order in chaotic economies.
Generally, the achievements of public price-fixing have been
dismal. Gross inequities and inefficiencies stemming from
controls tend to mar the operation of an economic system.
During the Fourth Century A.D., the Roman Emperor
Diocletian's mammoth attempt at price regulation brought
his empire to the brink of financial and social ruin. More
recently, President Richard Nixon's program to stifle the
nation's inflationary spiral with wage and price restraints
only made a healty recovery more difficult.
Montana's forty-four year experience with milk price
regulation has not proven as harrowing as the trials of
Diocletian and Nixon. It has, however, provoked enough
controversy to warrant a critical analysis by policy makers.
This report addresses several questions concerning the past
activities of, and future options for, government supervision
of the dairy industry in Montana.
Early History of Regulation
The Great Depression had a devastating impact on
Montana's prosperous dairy industry. To meet falling
consumer demand, milk dealers engaged in frantic price
cutting and givea:way schemes to attract customers.
Producers faced the fact that raw milk is highly perishable
and must be marketed promptly. Public health officials
worried that cost-conscious producers and processors
would cut corners too sharply and jeopardize the quality of
milk products. By 1934, milk industry representatives,
government officials, and some concerned citizens decided
that a free market was riot a suitable arrangement for
producing and distributing dairy products.
After a brief but unsuccessful attempt at self-regulation of
industry practices under New Deal price codes, dairymen
decided to lobby for government controls. Strong bipartisan
support assured the passage of the first Milk Control Act in
1935. A three-member board was granted temporary
emergency powers to set and enforce prices that would cover
production costs and help assure suitable profit margins in
the industry. In 1939, the milk lobby convinced lawmakers
that the temporary arrangement · should be made
permanent. A new five-member board, heavily weighted
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with industry representatives, was created and given
stronger price-fixing authority.
Economic order returned to the dairy industry by the
mid l 940's. It is difficult to say whether regulation or the war
economy was primarily responsible for the recovery. The
board was aggressive in extending price controls to most
areas of the state. Dairymen were united in their support of
board activities.
By the late l 950's there wete indications that milk
regulation was a shambles. Tension between economic
transformation of the industry and administration of the
milk control law had reached a critical stage. When the law
was first implemented, most dairy farmers produced,
processed, and distributed their own milk, and producers,
producer-distributors, and distributors each were entitled to
one seat on.the milk board. By the l 950's the old distributor
operation was being replaced by separate production and
processing-marketing firms, although producer-distributors
were still entitled to board representation. The Montana
Dairy Producers Association argued that the allocation of
seats on the board was now weighted in favor of distributor
interests. Similarly retail trade associations: noting that
their members were picking up a greater share of consumer
sales when compared with direct home delivery; argued for
representation on the board.
1957 Legislative Investigation
These arguments spawned a special legislative
investigation of the industry and the board in early 1957. A
joint, select committee uncovered evidence not only of
inadequacies in existing law but also instances of failure to
administer the law properly. The extreme perishability of
milk still kept producers within a "sell quickly or dump"
squeeze, and this problem was 'sometimes aggravated by
unscrupulous distributors · who bullied producers and
cheated them on purchase reports. A common trick was to
inform producers that their raw milk was destined for
production of ice cream, cheese, or animal feed. The price
paid to producers for these purposes was uncontrolled and
therefore set at the. discretion of distributors. Some
distributors would deliberately set low prices for the raw
milk, process it for drinking purposes, and sell it at the
higher, uncontrolled price. The profit gained by this
unethical transaction was hard to uncover, since reporting
requirements under the law were weak and lacked
uniformity.
The investigating committee also determined that the

board and its staff were often incompetent, indecisive, or
deliberately unfair when administering the law. One shrewd
board member, who represented milk distributors, had used
his position to some business colleagues' advantage. Prices
affecting producers had not been adjusted for years, and
there were strong suspicions of "behind-closed-doors" deals
between industry representatives and board members. One
source close to the dairy industry summed up the situation
by claiming that economic events and regulatory powers
were almost completely at the disposal of distributors and to
the detriment of producers and the public.
The report of the committee came too late in the
legislative session to instigate a comprehensive reform
package. Legislators and the governor settled, temporarily,
for two cosmetic changes - revising the allocation of seats
on the board to give producers more clout, and appointing
new individuals to the restructured board. Between
legislative sessions, representatives from all segments of the
industry grudgingly agreed to compromise their differences
and clean their own house, lest the legislature repeal the
entire law. Lobbyists eventually produced a reform bill
which strengthened reporting requirements and tempered
other inadequacies of the law. The most striking innovation
was the proviso that only consumers could sit on the new
five-member board. Supposedly, public members would
supervise dairy industry practices impartially. The 1959
legislature adopted this compromise, perhaps hoping that
this episode would conclude the controversial history of the
Milk Control Board.

processing and marketing that generally do not exist under
competitive conditions. For example, fluid milk is almost
always sold at the same price regardless of whether it is
'brought directly to your home or obtained from the
supermarket, and whether it is sold in plastic or paper
containers.
Another criticism leveled against controls is that retailers
rarely price their milk above the minimum charge specified
py the board. The board does not set maximum prices. Since
the minimum price is normally used regardless of location
_and transportation costs, critics believe that the board may
be overpricing milk. Critics also point to lower milk prices in
similar states and on federal installations not covered by
state law, noting that reasonable profits can apparently be
made under competitive arrangements.
Estimates of consumer demand for milk priced under
government control suggest that over a period of years
overpricing has probably led to smaller milk purchases by
the public than would have been made in a competitive
market. This has the consequence of cutting down the
income of dairy producers and channeling overpayments
into the processing-distribution sector. It is consequently
argued -that the Milk Control Act has great potential for
wrecking, not salvaging, much of the dairy industry.
Producer price controls have not come under much fire.
Many . economists believe that dairy farmers produce a
unique commodity under severe biological and economic
constraints. While some measure of price protection has
been supported, there also is fear that too much protection
may act as a disincentive. High incomes generated by price
controls can induce and protect inefficient productior,
methods, something not in the interest of consumers.
The Milk Control Board has recognized some of these
problems in recent years and has attempted to correct them
through the administrative process. Proposals to adjust
pricing formulas in 1976 and 1978 would have had the
indirect effect of generating competition and reducing some
profit margins in the industry. At the request of distributors.
both proposals were overturned in district court. A more
ambitious plan to make price increases less frequent and to
lower excess profits in the distribution sector recently has
been adopted in part. There is no indication whether dairy
lobbyists will challenge this modification in the courts. The
frustrations experienced by the board in recent years,
combined with the evidence reviewed, have convinced some
board members that only deregulation of wholesale and
retail prices will best serve the public interest. The board,
however, does not have authority to suspend controls.

Current Criticism of Regulation

Producers and distributors have continued to war with
one another over the structure of milk price regulation,
although the producers' position has improved remarkably
since 1959. In recent years, controversy has shifted in the
direction of consumer antagonism against the board.
Recent public opm10n surveys indicate significant
resentment over frequent increases in the price of fluid milk.
Several individuals have publicly argued for the
abandonment of controls and elimination of the Milk
Control Board. Ironically, these criticisms come at a time
when the board is required by law to give considerable
weight to consumer opinion and purchasing power, and has,
in fact, made sincere attempts to carry out these provisions.
The widespread sentiment that prices are needlessly high
and reflect industry influence is supported by empirical
studies. The Montana Legislative Auditor's report on price
control, published in 1976, sharply criticized the
consequences of controlling retail and wholesale prices in
the dairy industry. (Wholesale prices are the charges paid to
processor-distributors by retail outlets.) Some board
members also have publicly voiced these concerns.
High on the list of complaints is the large distributor gross
margin (DGM). The DGM is the difference between what
distributors pay producers for milk and the retail price.
Montana's DG M is considerably higher than those of
adjacent and similar states and it exceeds California's
average by 47 percent. Critics also focus on net profit
margins (profit as a percentage of net equity) for milk
distributors. Montana's average is approximately 18
percent, whereas the national average is about eight percent.
Contrary to industry views, the high margins are not due to
transportation costs. Rather, they reflect inefficiences in

Arguments of the Industry

The dairy industry has successfully resisted efforts to
weaken the regulatory structure, although arguments
in favor of continuing the status quo have changed
somewhat over time. Today, milk dealers are more
concerned about monopolization of their industry ·should
controls be abolished. Distributors fear that without price
protection the largest distributors - including one major
chain grocery store which processes and sells its own brand
- will deliberately slash prices in order to steal customers
from economically weaker firms. Many distributors would
be forced to quit because of "cutthroat" competition, and
there would be a domino effect on producer-suppliers. The
market eventually would regain equilibrium with, say, only
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the economic worth of price controls; this was and remains a
legislative prerogative. Although high courts in three states
have ruled that milk price controls violate private property
and due process rights, these decisions were based on · a
substantive due process doctrine frowned on by most courts,
including Montana's.
Legislators bent on reform .also have not had much
success. Several proposals to eliminate controls or give the
board freedom to establish differentials in pricing have been
quashed at the committee stage since 1937. Although two
deregulation bills finally survived House committee review
in 1979, they died on the floor by two-to-one margins. Dairy
producers, distributors, and retailers are well organized and
have weight in legislative circles.
Consumers are not well organized and their viewpoints
are not widely disseminated and considered. Proponents of
regulation use this vacuum to assert that the public is not
really concerned about milk prices. The plausibility of this
argument must be challenged. Consumerism, in the jargon
of economists, is a "public good." The costs of achieving
consumer goals - hiring lobbyists, appearing to present
testimony, taking time away from job or home - are
enormous to one individual and are typically shoved upon
one's neighbor, who in turn passes the burden, and so on.
Unless costs are shared to reduce individual burdens, public
goals cannot be easily expressed or achieved.
An organized public effort will be necessary to change the
milk control law, but convincing legislators to make the
change also will require a thorough understanding of
political realities. Not all Republican legislators can be
expected to support deregulation, even though their party
generally advocates the free market concept. Many
Republicans represent rural areas and share constituents'
fears that decontrol will hurt the local economy. Rural
Democrats often find themselves in a similar situation.
Other lawmakers have not been able to sort out the
fallacious arguments made by industry lobbyists. To date,
only urban-liberal Democrats and a few urban Republicans
have publicly supported deregulation. A legislative change
in the Act will come only when. urban, and some rural,
legislators are convinced that the available evidence
supports deregulation as a more equitable public policy.
Some reformers have considered the initiative process as a
substitute for slow and stubborn legislative machinery.
Deregulation may be so controversial that only a popular
vote can settle the issue; the table wine initiative of 1978 is a
good example. However, the language of an initiative may
be so poorly structured that unintended interpretations and
legislative backlash result. An alternative to legislation or an
initiative is to rely on the existing board to meet public
preferences, but this process can be easily manipulated by
the dairy industry. The administrative hearing process is a
lawyer's paradise. Unorganized or seemingly
"unprofessional" consumer views are easy targets in such a
setting; substantive arguments are often derailed by
procedural technicalities.

one or two distributors, fewer producers, and higher,
monopoly prices for milk products. Some dealers predict
even more dire results. They see financial disaster extending
to so many Montana dairymen that out-of-state suppliers,
charging extremely high prices, would be necessary to meet
consumer demand. In short, many dairymen conclude that
controls preserve, rather than destroy competition.
From both a theoretical and an empirical perspective, the
above arguments are rather specious. The distribution end
of the Montana dairy industry already is an oligopoly; a few
firms operate in a market where each firm's pricing activities
are highly interrelated and sensitive. Oligopolies tend
toward price stability. Because one firm's price-cutting action
would only provoke the same by other firms, a no-win
situation becomes evident. Extreme price-cutting is rare.
Similarly, no one firm could raise prices without its
competitors attracting the firm's customers by keeping their
prices stable. Unless the firms act in concert, increases
cannot be maintained. Action of this kind constitutes pricefixing and is illegal under federal and state law. In addition,
price gouging designed to eliminate competition is unlawful
and can command stiff penalties. Several Montana
distributors did engage in illegal price-fixing in the midI 960's and were fined accordingly. However, this should not
be an excuse for substituting inefficient price controls for
antitrust enforcement. With the additional provision of a
posting requirement, whereby all firms "post" their prices
regularly with regulatory agencies, any possibility of deviant
price behavior by oligopolies can be controlled.
One should not ignore the fact that development of
oligopoly in the distribution business and decline in the
number of dairy farms have taken place during a period of
state regulation. One individual close to the industry has
privately described the distribution network as a shared
monopoly. In April 1979, two firms alone controlled 57
percent of fluid milk distribution. Another dramatic
development is the reduction in the number of dairy farmers
over the past forty years. Even price control cannot protect
grossly inefficient operation.
The experience of several states with resale price
deregulation serves as a counterweight to industry fears of
monopoly control. Many distributors in these states have
stayed in business when competition forced them to
innovate. Many dairy producers have also continued to
thrive. Frequently, departure from the industry is the result
of carelessness and not deregulation. A Federal Trade
Commission report suggests that states like Montana with a
small population and large territory could sustain several
small and medium-level dairy operations due to location
and transportation advantages not always present in smaller
or more population-dense regions. Deregulation in
Montana would not likely be a cure worse than the disease.
Past Reform Attempts
Before considering a workable alternative to the existing

Milk Control Act, it is important to mention possible
avenues to reform. There have been several attempts to alter
significantly the regulatory structure in Montana, and each
has been fraught with booby-traps.
Some critics have sought a judicial opinion declaring
price regulation unconstitutional. The Montana Supreme
Court made it clear in Milk Control Board v. Rehberg
( 1962) that it would not make substantive judgments about

Conclusion
When judged by many of its aims, the Montana Milk
Control Act has been a failure. It has promoted several
economic inefficiencies damaging to the industry and the
public. It cannot prevent the closure of many milk dealers,
but it has potential for granting undue political and
3

economic advantage, especially to the processing and
distribution sectors. Despite the consumer orientation of the
present board, the absence of broad public partidpation and
the limits of the law allow free play to industry pressures.
The feeling of some regulators that the Administrative
Procedures Act unfairly limits speedy and effective action
by the board for everyone's benefit is well-taken, but the
prospect of an administrative agency operating without
consistent and equitable procedures is an undesirable
alternative. Besides, this concern does not address the
underlying difficulties of regulation.
If any public interest can be identified concerning milk
regulation it is that Montanans would be better served by
deregulation of prices at the retail and wholesale levels. A
program to this end could be instituted gradually under
legislative guidelines. Considering the power of several
distributors, · it may be politically wise to allow the Milk
Control Board discretion to reimplement controls on a
temporary basis in marketing areas experiencing chaotic
conditions. If this power is granted, it should be exercised
only with extreme caution by the board. The potential for
abuse of this power is great because of inevitable presence of
strong and selfish interests. Although a good case can be
made for retaining controls on producer pricers, it would be
wiser over the long run to suspend them in conjunction with
establishment of cooperative processing and/ or marketing
arrangements. A program of this kind would allow
producers to maintain their farms while allowing them to
take advantage of economies of scale available from
cooperative enterprise. Diffusion of economic power should

make monopolization of political influence less probable.
The state also should apply a vigorous antitrust policy
(includipg posting of prices) to the dairy industry, rather
than acquiescing in the misconception that price controls
preserve competition. Montana has machinery for this task
in the Department of Justice's Antitrust Enforcement
Bureau. However, the legislature will have to beef up the
Bureau's budget. This will require convincing some
legislators that antitrust policy would deal more effectively
with anti-competitive practices than a regulatory program
which does more to hide these practices than control them.
It cannot be overemphasized that organized consumer
activity will be necessary to achieve much of the stated
program, regardless of whether it is achieved legislatively or
through popular initiative. Policy makers, dairymen, and
the public should take note that the Federal Trade
Commission has recently demonstrated a willingness to
overturn state laws which countenance monopoly rather
than protect the citizenry. Montanans may soon have to
decide whether they should clean their own house before
"Big Brother" in Washington extends a helping, but possibly
unwelcome, hand.
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